

In Control but Incoherent

Institutional Power and Message Discipline in Congress

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Abstract

Parties build electorally-beneficial brands through legislative cohesion. But getting to “yes” often produces divisive intra-party debates as illustrated by the clichés “Democrats in Disarray” and “Republican Civil War.” We argue that institutional power undermines message discipline—the ability of co-partisans to say the same things about the same issues. Congressional majorities may agree on broad goals, but individuals must compromise and promote specific legislation. Presidents place issues on the agenda co-partisans must defend. Dis-empowered parties, by contrast, can simply oppose. To test our theory, we develop a novel, text-based measure of message discipline in House and Senate floor speeches (1973–2016) using topic models and contextual embeddings. We find that non-presidential minorities exercise stronger message discipline than presidential majorities, and on-message lawmakers are less effective legislators. However, the House majority’s procedural power offsets these disadvantages. Our results deepen our understanding of congressional message politics, with implications for perceived polarization and thermostatic backlash.

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In 2017, with full control of Congress and the White House, Republicans mounted their most serious effort to repeal the Affordable Care Act. The party spent years campaigning against the law, which they “consistently discussed...as a costly expansion of government” (Hopkins 2018, 692), and House Republicans had voted to repeal or amend the legislation over 50 times (Rogers 2017). Yet, at this key moment, the party not only failed to repeal the law, but abandoned their crusade entirely. What changed? Since the bill first passed in 2010, Democrats had held, or shared, institutional power in Washington. Without full governing responsibility, Republicans focused on their messaging efforts, but they “they never came to agreement on what the replacement would look like” (Scott and Kliff 2017), because they never had to. By contrast, Democrats spent the 111th (2009-2010) Congress—a period in which the party held a filibuster-proof Senate majority—in a contentious intra-party debate over the ACA. Collectively, the party pivoted from a focus on the public option and coverage to insurance companies and affordability (Hopkins 2018). At the individual level, lawmakers focused on different aspects of the bill, likely those that would appeal to their own constituencies. For example, Senator Warner (D-VA) emphasized the bill’s benefits to small businesses (Congressional Record, November 18, 2009, S11447), whereas Senator Mikulski (D-MD) discussed health coverage as “a basic human right” (Congressional Record, December 7, 2009, S12607). Despite their muddled message, Democrats passed the bill on a party line vote—something the rhetorically unified Republicans were unable to do seven years later. Parties want to win the messaging battle and the roll call vote. But as the story of the Affordable Care Act makes clear, parties sometimes struggle to achieve both goals.

Members of Congress pursue individual objectives, like reelection, policy, and power in Congress (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974). Yet these goals are easier to achieve when the party holds the chamber majority (Cox and McCubbins 2005) and presidency (Levinson and Pildes 2006; Lee 2009). Institutional power creates a virtuous cycle: empowered parties control committees, set the agenda, work together to pass preferred (or gatekeep

disfavored) policies, build an electorally-beneficial party brand, and win the power again (Cox and McCubbins 1993). But this procedural view may overstate party unity (e.g., Lee 2018). As in the example of the Affordable Care Act, even when parties agree on broad policy goals, debates over the underlying substance and symbols play out in public. Rhetoric, then, creates opportunity and risk. When parties speak as one and exercise message discipline, they are more likely to positively shape media coverage (Sellers 2009), burnish their party's brand (Aldrich 1995; Lee 2016), and boost public support (Groeling 2010). When they fail to cohere around a single message, they dilute their brand (Aldrich 1995; Lee 2016), attract negative news coverage (Groeling 2010), and may even fail to pass policy (Sellers 2009). Yet, existing theories paint a conflicting picture of how institutional power—here, defined as partisan control of the chamber majority and presidency—affects a party's ability to exercise message discipline. Are parties able to wield procedural power to control the rhetorical agenda, just as they are with the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Koger and Lebo 2017)? Or does governing responsibility inevitably complicate message discipline (Groeling 2010; Lee 2016)? Further complicating this debate, we lack a scalable, quantitative measure of message discipline grounded in what members say. Answering this question is important for our understanding of party brand building, procedural power, and subsequent work on public views of the parties and polarization.

We argue that institutional power and message discipline are fundamentally at odds. In party voting, power unites; in party communication, it divides. Parties that control Congress and the White House have incentives to use their procedural resources to achieve their policy goals (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Lee 2009, 2016; Smith 2007). However, members must defend their actions. Changing the status quo (or even failing to act) creates winners and losers (Arnold 1990) and legislative compromise may upset primary voters (Anderson, Butler and Harbridge-Yong 2020). Knowing this, party leaders block divisive policies, select those over which the party agrees (Beckmann 2010; Cox

and McCubbins 2005), and coordinate messaging strategies that members will individually promote (Green 2015; Harris 2005; Sellers 2009). In the aggregate, parties want to exercise message discipline—which we define as members’ ability to say the same things about the same issues—as doing so shapes media coverage, builds support for policies, and increases the appeal of the party as a whole (Groeling 2010; Lee 2016; Sellers 2009). Yet members also have individual incentives to appeal to their distinct constituencies, which may be at odds with the collective message (Harris 2005). As the party brand is a collective good, individuals face incentives to defect by strategically taking different positions (Mayhew 1974), tailoring their explanations (Grose, Malhotra and Parks Van Houweling 2015), and adopting appealing presentational styles (Ban and Kaslovsky N.d.; Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013) that contribute toward their own electoral security. These choices, while individually optimal, aggregate to a diffuse collective message, which limits the degree to which a party can reap the benefits of unity. Institutionally dis-empowered lawmakers face these same tradeoffs, however, their messaging objectives are different from those of the empowered party. Without institutional power, “A party unburdened by policy responsibility can simply oppose without specify what, if any, policy alternative it might support” (Lee 2016, 55; see also Green 2015; Noble 2023). Opposition does not require that the party agree on an alternative, facilitating message discipline. Taken together, we hypothesize that when a party holds the chamber majority, the White House—and especially both—it will exercise weaker message discipline than parties that lack institutional power.

To test our hypotheses, we leverage the text of House and Senate floor speeches delivered between 1973–2016 (Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy 2018) to develop a novel measure of message discipline. First, we determine *what* members are talking about by fitting a keyword-assisted topic model (Eshima, Imai and Sasaki 2023)) to our corpus and assigning each speech to one of 21 policy issues from the Comparative Agendas Project (Jones et al. 2023). Second, we determine *how similarly* parties discuss issues by embedding each

speech in a high-dimensional vector space. We then pair every speech in our corpus with every other speech given on the same topic, on the same day, by another member of the same party and compute the cosine similarity of these two vectors. Thus, we have a scalar ranging between 0 and 1 indicating the semantic similarity of every party-day-topic-speech pair. Using this metric, we support our theory of institutional power and message discipline. In particular, we find that parties controlling both the presidency and chamber majority exercise less message discipline than those with no institutional power. In the Senate, message discipline is also weaker for majority members and presidential co-partisans. Yet, we find that the non-presidential House majority exercises the most message discipline. Although inconsistent with our theory, this result is consistent with rules governing House debate, stronger control of the floor, and theories of procedural power (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Smith 2007). We conclude our study with an investigation of the consequences of message discipline for policymaking at the member-pair level. Consistent with the implications of our theory, we find that when lawmaker-pairs are more on-message they are less legislatively effective.

Our results highlight the fundamental tension between institutional power and message discipline. We contribute to the literature on legislative cartels (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Koger and Lebo 2017) and message politics (Evans 2001; Green 2015; Lee 2016, 2018), resolving an ongoing debate with an innovative measure of message discipline across forty years of congressional rhetoric. Our results also have implications for the literature on member self-presentation (Ban and Kaslovsky N.d.; Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013; Noble 2023). We speculate that the out-party's asymmetrical messaging strength could be one cause for thermostatic backlash in congressional elections (Grossmann and Wlezien 2024). Although these messaging battles may reduce support for specific policies or parties, they also highlight that polarization, at least as perceived by voters, is likely lower than the roll-call record would suggest (cf. Lee 2018).

Two Theories of Institutional Power and Party Brands

Members of Congress are motivated by, and take actions to achieve, individual goals: reelection, policy preferences, and institutional power (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974). However, lawmakers are also members of a party, and share a common brand that “consists of actions, beliefs, and outcomes commonly attributed to the party as a whole” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 110). Members, then, operate at two levels—that of the individual, and that of the party—when they take actions in the legislature (e.g., voting, speaking). They work together to promote a consistent image, which strengthens their party’s brand (Cox and McCubbins 2005). When lawmakers promote a common brand, they create clear distinctions between what they and their opponents stand for, giving voters a reason to choose them over the opposition (Lee 2016). A clear and consistent message is more likely to attract journalists attention and shape news coverage (Sellers 2009), and “the party which is able to make its definition of the issues prevail is likely to take over the government” (Schattschneider 1960, 73). Internally divided parties, by contrast, are likely to attract negative news coverage and damage their reputation (Groeling 2010). Division may signal incompetence or obscure salient differences between the two parties (Lee 2016). Thus, individual lawmakers are willing to bear some collective action costs to contribute to the party brand (for example, by voting for a bill they might otherwise oppose) and promote internal cohesion (e.g., Butler and Powell 2014; Carson et al. 2010).

In theories of legislative voting, institutional power (i.e., majority control, White House control) tends to make internal cohesion more salient and easier to achieve. When a bill comes to the floor, rank-and-file lawmakers face a binary choice—vote for or against. However, bills do not spontaneously appear on the agenda. They are strategically chosen and packaged by coalition leaders (e.g., committee chairs, party leaders, the president) from the universe of possible issues with an eye toward what will pass the chamber and what constituents will support (Arnold 1990). In particular, Cartel Theory holds that partisan majorities in Congress exercise two forms of agenda control: they use negative

agenda control to block bills that would divide their party and positive agenda control to promote bills that unite their party and, ideally, divide the opposition (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Lee 2009, 2016; Smith 2007). By working together, the majority produces a favorable legislative record and beneficial party brand. Here, a virtuous cycle takes hold where “The better the majority party’s brand name, the better will be the prospects for (re)election of its various candidates and the better will be the prospects for (re)attainment of majority status” (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 7). With the majority safely in hand, parties can then help members achieve individual goals by distributing committee seats and enacting preferred policies.

A similar logic applies when a party controls the White House. As the most salient actor in American politics, the president can set the congressional agenda—especially during unified government (Beckmann 2010; Edwards and Wood 1999; Rutledge and Larsen Price 2014). When a party holds the presidency and both congressional chambers, they have a limited time advance partisan bills across institutions and turn policy preferences into law (Binder 1999; Levinson and Pildes 2006; Sundquist 1988). However, White House agenda setting, even without chamber control, is generally sufficient to induce some cohesion at the roll call stage. In general, presidents and their congressional parties naturally share ideological goals (Bond and Fleisher 1990), and co-partisans have incentives to support their president. To the extent that the party brand affects the electoral fates of all those running under it, “No member of Congress is as important as the president in defining the collective images of the parties” (Lee 2009, 77; see also Jacobson 2019). Perceptions of a lawmaker’s support for a co-partisan president bear on their own approval and electoral outcomes (Gronke, Koch and Wilson 2003; Lebo and O’Geen 2011; Noble 2023) and cohesion across branches can strengthen a parties’ collective reputation (Lee 2009). Thus, presidential co-partisans in congress generally rally around the president’s agenda, while those in the other party oppose it (Christenson and Kriner 2017; Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Lee 2009).

Taken together, this literature holds that institutional power, as embodied by majority and White House control, should strongly influence party cohesion. Yet these are theories of legislative *voting*—an arena where choices for rank-and-file lawmakers are particularly stark. Of course, members do cast votes with an eye toward their constituency (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002), but as politics has polarized, “voting the constituency” increasingly means voting with one’s party (Jacobson 2017, 55). The costs of collective action in this domain are also overstated, as Lee (2009, 16) points out, “Members are going to cast votes anyway....voting with the party need not be any more costly than voting against the party. Legislators often aren’t doing anything ‘extra’ by going along with their parties.” If coalition leaders have done their jobs and appropriately packaged the alternatives, lawmakers should find it natural and easy to vote for the party’s agenda.

Yet this logic does not necessarily extend to theories of partisan *communication*. As with voting, the party, as a collective, wants to present a unified message to voters. When messaging is consistent, other lawmakers are more likely to adopt and promote the message, the press is more likely to frame the debate in the party’s terms, and voters are more likely to use those frames to justify their attitudes toward specific policies and support them (Evans 2001; Hopkins 2018; Sellers 2009). However, unlike an up-or-down vote, communication is more costly, more visible, and more challenging. First, members (or their staffs) must take the time and resources to craft and deliver a message. And perhaps not once, but many times, over the course of the policymaking process (Harris 2005). Second, members cannot message about everything, they must select a particular subset of the agenda, which can create an ideological impression distinct from their less salient roll call behavior (Cormack 2016; Grimmer, Westwood and Messing 2014). Members, then, need to be strategic about which messages they promote. Finally, unlike voting, there is more to communication than an up or down vote. Beyond echoing the party’s talking points, members can deploy an infinite number of alternatives, or even stay silent. Ultimately, “both congressional parties have incentives to develop and present messages

collectively,” and these complications affect both parties (Green 2015, 71)—which, on its own, supports the idea that cohesion in communication is more difficult than in voting. And knowing this, party leaders craft messages that ideally offset these costs (Harris 2005). But do these issues affect both the institutionally powerful and institutionally weaker party *equally*? We argue that they do not.

When parties control the chamber majority, they must govern. “In order to claim that they are working for constituents’ interests, legislators need to produce successful policy initiatives” (Sellers 2009, 5), which requires that the party propose, and defend, a legislative agenda. Yet, governing requires compromise, within the party, and sometimes, with the opposition. These half loaves are unlikely to be as ideologically pure as the more ambitious “message bills” that parties propose when out of power (Lee 2016). They are, then, likely to deflate constituents who increasingly prioritize issue-based representation (Lapinski et al. 2016), especially primary voters (Anderson, Butler and Harbridge-Yong 2020). Intra-party dissent, masked by the roll call record, will appear in lawmakers’ individual communications (Lee 2018). Even in an idealized case where the party fully agrees on the substance of legislation, lawmakers need to explain their votes to constituents (or subgroups), and in so doing so, will tailor their messaging to gain support, blunt criticism, or redirect attention (Grimmer 2013; Grose, Malhotra and Parks Van Houweling 2015). The minority party must consider similar dynamics, but their task is easier. Because they do not bear as much governing responsibility as the majority, they can coordinate around a strategy of opposition and message politics (Lee 2016). They do not need to specify any alternative policy they would support, and if they do, it can be a partisan bill that would never survive the legislative process. Finally, raw numbers alone should make the minority’s coordination task easier. Even under conditions on party polarization, the majority’s seat advantage should mechanically increase intra-party heterogeneity, producing a more diffuse message.

Minority Discipline Hypothesis: Minority party members will exercise stronger

message discipline than majority party members.

Presidents provide agenda leadership, but their efforts in this domain are likely to complicate their congressional party's efforts to exercise message discipline. Although they may consult with legislative leaders (Arnold 1990; Smith 2007) and anticipate what co-partisan legislators will support (Beckmann 2010), a president operates on a different calendar and in a different electorate than their congressional co-partisans (e.g., Light 1999; Groeling 2010). They have the power to raise the salience of issues, and in some cases, force them onto the congressional agenda (Canes-Wrone 2006; Kernell 1997). These may not be the same issues the congressional party wants to take up or defend, and yet, they may have little choice but to support their party leader's agenda (Beckmann 2010; Cohen 2019; Lebo and O'Geen 2011; Lee 2016). By contrast, opposition party members can typically increase their own standing by simply opposing the president (Groeling 2010; Green 2015; Noble 2023), especially as presidential approval has become party polarized (Donovan et al. 2019).

Presidential Out-Party Discipline Hypothesis: Presidential co-partisans will exercise stronger message discipline than presidential out-partisans.

Ultimately, the interaction of these two factors should put a party at the largest disadvantage when it comes to message discipline. Majority presidential co-partisans hold unparalleled governing responsibility—they have the power to move their legislation through the chamber, and it will generally be supported by the co-partisan president. But this burden of action will force parties to focus more heavily on legislating as opposed to symbolic message politics (Lee 2016). This burden of responsibility may also create tension between the president and the congressional party as they fight for control of the agenda (Groeling 2010). Again, legislating requires internal compromise, which will frustrate efforts to put forward the kinds of simple and clear messages parties aim to promote (Sellers 2009). By contrast, the non-presidential minority party—the party in the “deep minority” (Green 2015)—is fully liberated from responsibility and can focus fully

on simple and uncontroversial messages (Groeling 2010; Lee 2016), which will promote message discipline.

Deep Minority Discipline Hypothesis: Non-presidential minority partisans will exercise stronger message discipline than presidential majority partisans.

Measuring Message Discipline in Floor Speeches

We test these hypotheses using evidence from floor speeches in the House and Senate delivered between 1973–2016. We focus on floor speeches because what lawmakers say on the floor is often germane to the legislation on which they vote. Further, if majorities leverage negative and positive agenda control, then we would expect message discipline on the floor to be higher than in other constituency-targeted communications (Blum, Cormack and Shoub 2023), where lawmakers talk about non-legislative issues, where the issue space is less constrained, and where party leaders have less influence. Floor speeches serve as a harder test of our theory: they help us understand how parties discuss issues when those discussions are subject to the same selection biases that affect roll call voting. Beyond these considerations, floor debate can serve as a window into message discipline more broadly. These speeches provide an individualized measure of what members prioritize and how they communicate those priorities to other lawmakers, donors, and constituents (e.g., Hill and Hurley 2002; Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Witko et al. 2021). What members say in floor speeches is often correlated with other types of member communication (Grimmer 2013; Noble 2023; Russell and Wen 2021).

A Novel Measure of Message Discipline

Our corpus of floor speeches comes from Gentzkow, Shapiro and Taddy (2018). We begin our time series on the first day of the 93rd Congress (January 3, 1973) and end it

during the 114th Congress (September 9, 2016, when the authors' data ends).¹ We then use this raw text to measure message discipline, which define as the degree to which partisans speak in the same way—evoking similar themes, marshalling the same arguments, or even using the same pat phrases—when they discuss the same issues.

As an example of what we mean by message discipline, we return to our running example of debate over the Affordable Care Act. Consider two Republican speeches on the topic. In one statement, Senate Minority Leader McConnell (R-KY) argued that “The American people want health care that is more affordable and easier to obtain. What they don’t want is a government takeover of health care that costs trillions of dollars...” (Congressional Record, July 27, 2009, S8107). Earlier, Senator DeMint (R-SC) had argued that “We don’t need a massive government takeover of health care...It won’t work. We can’t afford it.” (Congressional Record, June 23, 2009, S6918). While not identical, these two speeches are clearly on message. They both use the phrase “government takeover of health care” and raise issues of cost and affordability. By contrast, the following two Democrats are not on message. In a speech, Senator Warner (D-VA) defended the ACA on economic grounds: “small businesses are often not able to offer health insurance. Consequently, we have good workers who are not able to move into these firms and help spur job growth because they are caught in dead-end jobs” (Congressional Record, November 18, 2009, S11447). Meanwhile, Senator Mikulski (D-MD) argued for the bill on moral grounds: “I truly believe health care reform is the most important social justice vote we will cast in this decade. Why? Because we are talking about providing universal access to health care, which I believe is a basic human right” (Congressional Record, December 7, 2009, S12607). Although both statements are about the ACA, these two Senators use very different arguments to promote and defend the bill. Even if the Democratic arguments were persuasive to different voters or individually beneficial to the speakers, parties, as collectives, want to promote a simple and consistent message to shape media coverage

¹We exclude all non-substantive speeches (those containing thirty words or fewer) and speeches given between January 3–20 in a presidential transition year, following Noble (2023).

and voter attitudes (Sellers 2009). Although the Democrats both support the ACA, the ways in which they promote it differ. Therefore, the pair of Republican speeches are more effective. Given this discussion, we want our measure of message discipline to account for the fact that two legislators are (i) discussing the same issue² and (ii) using similar arguments and language to do so.

To create our measure of message discipline, we proceed in two steps. First, we isolate the most prevalent topic of each speech in our corpus using a keyword assisted topic model (keyATM, Eshima, Imai and Sasaki 2023). Unlike an unsupervised LDA model, keyATM allows researchers to point the model toward particular issues through the use of topic-specific keywords. Here, we define those topics according to the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) coding scheme (Jones et al. 2023), which classifies objects like legislative bills, party platforms, and news headlines into a consistent set of 21 policy topics including the macroeconomy, health, and foreign affairs. This choice allows us to focus on a well-known and stable set of broad topics across Congresses.

To generate keywords for each topic, we download the Democratic and Republican Party platforms from 1948–2020, which have been coded at the quasi-sentence level by Wolbrecht et al. (2023) according to the CAP scheme. Then, we calculate the tf-idf score of each stemmed word in this corpus at the topic level and extract the top 15 words associated with each topic (see Appendix A). As the language parties use to discuss issues in their platforms is likely similar to the rhetoric members of Congress use in their floor speeches, these terms served as our keywords. We also used our substantive knowledge to create two additional keyword lists, which we knew would be prevalent in our corpus: parliamentary language (e.g., quorum, yield) and filler words (e.g., people, think). After constructing our keyword lists, we applied standard pre-processing to our corpus (as detailed in Grimmer, Roberts and Stewart 2022).³ We fit a unique keyATM model to

²We would not expect lawmakers to be on message across issue domains, where different positions and arguments are relevant to different policy topics. This logic is also consistent with the fact that party leaders often coordinate messaging around specific policies, rather than across issues (e.g., Harris 2005).

³We tokenize to unigrams, remove non-text characters, lowercase words, remove a set of stop words

each two-year Congress in each chamber separately. This choice allowed for variation in language use across chambers and years, while the use of keyATM stabilized the broad topics. After fitting these models, we assigned each speech a single topic code according to the highest proportion topic. Compared to other approaches, this procedure resulted in topics that qualitatively aligned with the main theme of the speech. To match our theory and focus on policy-specific rhetoric, we drop all speeches categorized into the parliamentary and filler topics from our analysis.

Topic prevalence provides one measure of message discipline, but it is insufficient for our purposes. Our interest is in the degree of similarity in partisan rhetoric *within* issues. For this second step, we leverage OpenAI’s `text-embedding-3-small` model to convert each speech in our corpus to a numeric embedding vector that encodes rich, multi-dimensional, semantic information about the text. With a window length of 8,192 tokens, this model can handle long documents and represent them in a high-quality embedding space created by OpenAI’s computationally and financially expensive training process.⁴ We can then rely on the vector representations of speeches to measure the cosine similarity of any two documents.⁵

To construct the final measure of message discipline, we reshape our data into pairs of speeches given by (i) co-partisans, (ii) on the same topic, (iii) on the same day. By comparing speeches within days, we maximize the likelihood that speeches on the same topic cover the same underlying sub-issue. For example, lawmakers may discuss defense policy on day t and $t + 1$, however, day t may concern Ukraine and day $t + 1$ may concern Israel. In the event that lawmakers discuss both policies on the same day, our key

(those listed as stop words in the `quanteda` package and a specific set of Congressional Record stop words identified by Ash, Morelli and Van Weelden (2017)) and those with fewer than three characters, stem words, and remove words that appear fewer than 100 times or across fewer than 100 speeches.

⁴There is a very small number of speeches containing more tokens than the `text-embedding-3-small` model can handle. We exclude them from the analysis, resulting in 2,770 (0.04%) dropped pairs.

⁵Importantly, we use the raw embedding vectors to construct our measure of speech similarity. These embeddings are replicable, in that any scholar who generated an embedding vector for speech i in our corpus would output the same embedding vector. We do not, for example, ask ChatGPT to qualitatively assess the similarity of speech pairs, a stochastic process which may or may not replicate across various model runs, even when using the same underlying model.

quantity of interest is a comparison between parties, and as such, these topic selection effects should affect both parties. After constructing these party-topic-day-speech dyads, we compute the cosine similarity of each pair's embedding vector. This method produces a scalar quantity on the interval $[0, 1]$, which we interpret as a measure of the degree to which the two speeches are "on-message." As the two speeches become more similar, and thus, more on message, this value will converge toward 1. Our final dataset contains 2,068,105 intra-party observations for the Senate and 3,656,790 intra-party observations for the House during 93rd–114th Congress.

Before proceeding, we note that our theoretical definition and measurement of message discipline is agnostic to the source of that discipline. Although many messages are coordinated by leaders, for example, through the Democratic Message Board and Republican Theme Team (e.g., Harris 2005), we do not have any direct evidence in our study of where these frames come from, which would be both difficult to procure and to match with congressional rhetoric. Dyads in our data may appear on message due to pressure from leadership, coordination at the faction level (Clarke 2020), or innate ideological, attitudinal, or constituency factors shared by member-pairs. These all likely serve as sources of the message discipline we observe. Given our theoretical framework, our interest is in how institutional power affects the degree to which any pair of members promotes a similar message, irrespective of where that message comes from. The key threat to inference would be if sources of discipline differed depending on a member's level of institutional power. However, both parties always have leaders and factions coordinating messaging, and lawmakers always have ideological, attitudinal, or constituency-based factors that shape their behavior. That the relevance of these factors may differ alongside institutional power is directly incorporated into our theoretical framework. If anything, the relative ability of the majority party to control floor proceedings (Harris 2005) and the president's agenda-setting power (Beckmann 2010) should bias against our hypotheses.

Validity of Our Measure of Message Discipline

To demonstrate that our measure of message discipline identifies speeches that are semantically similar, we conduct two validation tests. First, we assess convergent (or hypothesis) validity: whether our measure of speech similarity covaries predictably with other measures of member similarity. Here, we consider two variables that should positively correlate with rhetorical similarity: whether two lawmakers represent the same state and whether two lawmakers are more ideologically proximate. In Table 1, that is what we find. Controlling for chamber, Congress, and topic fixed effects, in column 1, lawmakers (in the same party) hailing from the same state deliver speeches that are about 0.02 points more similar on the unit scale as compared to pairs hailing from different states. In column 2, we find that as the negative absolute difference between a co-partisan pair's DW-NOMINATE scores decreases, their speeches become more similar.

Table 1: Convergent Validity

	(1)	(2)
Same State Lawmakers	0.023*** (0.001)	
Ideological Proximity		0.041*** (0.002)
Fixed Effects		
Chamber	✓	✓
Congress	✓	✓
Topic	✓	✓
Num.Obs.	5,722,125	5,722,046
R2 Adj.	0.145	0.145
R2 Within Adj.	0.001	0.001

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: The dependent variable in both models is a measure of similarity between two speeches, ranging from 0–1. Coefficients come from ordinary least squares models with standard errors clustered at the pair-level.

Second, we assess face validity: do speeches coded by the model as similar appear similar on their face? Conducting this face validity test is not necessarily straightfor-

ward as speeches may be long and similarity is multidimensional. To that end, in the supplemental appendix, we present the full text of paired speeches at various similarity thresholds. First, we show that, as expected, identical speeches have a cosine similarity of 1. Next, we present two paired speeches about the Zika Virus with a similarity of 0.9. Although the speakers cover a range of topics in these two lengthy documents, they focus on similar themes such as the virus's rapid spread, its origins, and the threat to pregnant women. For example, Senator Cornyn (R-TX) expresses concern that "Although many of the symptoms are relatively minor, Zika has been found to cause severe birth defects in children if the virus is acquired by a woman of childbearing age who is, in fact, pregnant," while Senator Rob Portman (R-OH) raises concerns about "serious consequences for the most vulnerable in our society, particularly the elderly...and pregnant women." At 0.5, the differences between speeches increase, but in our example, still cover similar themes of racial discrimination in housing. As we approach 0, speeches share fewer similarities beyond their general topic, which we include ex-ante as part of the pairing process. Ultimately, these examples provide insight into how our measure works and demonstrate some evidence of face validity.

Message Discipline over Time

To provide some visual evidence consistent with our hypotheses, in Figure 1, we plot message discipline over time. On the x -axis, we track time in terms of two-year congresses. On the y -axis, we plot the mean level of message similarity for Democrats (in blue) and Republicans (in red). The background shading indicates which of the two parties held the majority during that period. In the top panel, we show this relationship for the Senate. Here, we see that when Democrats hold the Senate majority, Republicans consistently exercise stronger message discipline. When Republicans hold the majority, this relationship is reversed. This descriptive result is consistent with the Minority Discipline Hypothesis: the party holding the minority exercises stronger message discipline than




Figure 1: Average intra-party message discipline in the Senate and House for each two-year Congress. Higher scores indicate higher message discipline. In the Senate, the minority party exercises more message discipline than the majority. In the House, Democrats generally exercise more message discipline than Republicans. Blue (red) shading indicates that Democrats (Republicans) are the majority party during that Congress.

the majority.

The bottom panel visualizes the same relationship for the House. Here, the patterns differ from those in the Senate. Since the early 1980s, House Democrats have consistently

exercised greater message discipline than Republicans. These aggregate patterns contrast with our Minority Discipline Hypothesis—at least when Republicans are in the minority. However, they are consistent with accounts about the high degree of in-fighting within the House Republican Caucus (e.g., Lee 2018). We also note that these are party-level averages. Even if House Democrats exercise greater message discipline overall, we cannot, from this visualization, rule out within-pair increases in message discipline as institutional power changes hands. We take up this analysis in the following sections.

Empirical Strategy

To formally test our hypotheses, we specify our dependent variable as the cosine similarity between speech-pair dyads at the party-topic-day level. We regress this measure on a key independent variable: a categorical indicator accounting for a party's level of institutional power. The baseline level for this variable is that a party is in the deep minority—that is, they are both the chamber minority and the non-presidential party. The remaining categories include majority party only, presidential party only, and both majority and presidential party.

Our models include a series of time-varying controls that could induce similarity between speech pairs. These are whether at least one member of a pair is a congressional leader, the negative absolute distance between a pairs' previous vote share, whether both members are freshmen, and in the Senate, whether both members' seats are up for election at the end of the Congress. In one set of models, we investigate the relationship between institutional power and message discipline by pooling across the party. Here, we control for a pairs' party, absolute DW-NOMINATE distance, whether a pair is the same gender, and whether both members of the pair are white. One potential concern about this approach, however, is that majority parties are, definitionally, larger, and therefore, should be more ideologically heterogeneous. Message discipline across the party may decrease

mechanically as more members join the coalition. In the second set of models, we drop these latter covariates and instead include pair fixed effects allowing us to control for all time-invariant characteristics of pairs and assess how message discipline changes within a given pair of lawmakers. Any changes we identify here cannot be directly attributed to party size. In these models, we also include topic fixed effects to control for possible heterogeneity across topics. We cluster standard errors at the member-pair level in all models.

Results

We formally test our hypotheses about institutional power and message discipline in Table 2. In column 1, we investigate the relationship in the Senate, pooling across all members of the party. In line with expectations from our suite of hypotheses, we find that the deep minority (i.e., non-presidential minority) exercises the strongest level of message discipline. Majority status and presidential co-partisanship are both individually associated with weaker message discipline. Further, a party controlling both the majority and White House exercises weaker message discipline than the deep minority party, but this loss of control is equivalent to a party that holds the majority but not the presidency. In column 2, we test these same hypotheses in the Senate including member-pair and topic fixed effects. As such, these coefficients can be interpreted as the average within-pair, within-topic change in message discipline as the party's institutional status changes. Here, we observe similar, albeit attenuated, effects. Institutional power is always associated with weaker message discipline in the Senate. In terms of substantive effect size, the coefficients on majority and majority and presidential co-partisanship are larger in absolute magnitude than all other controls in the model, including whether members' seats are up for election, whether they are both freshmen, or whether they are the same gender. We conclude that institutional power has a large substantive effect on message discipline

Table 2: Relationship Between Institutional Power and Message Discipline

	Senate		House	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Majority Party	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)
Presidential Co-Partisan	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Majority Party and Presidential Co-Partisan	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.001)
Other Chamber Control	-0.001 (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.000)
Republican	0.009*** (0.001)		-0.011*** (0.001)	
Ideological Distance	-0.064*** (0.005)		-0.040*** (0.002)	
Same Gender Pair	-0.037*** (0.002)		-0.015*** (0.001)	
Both White	-0.011** (0.004)		-0.008*** (0.001)	
Leader in Pair	-0.007*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Similar Previous Vote Share	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
Both Freshman	0.033*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)
Both In-Cycle (Senate)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)		
Intercept	0.614*** (0.005)		0.678*** (0.001)	
Fixed Effects:				
Member Dyad		✓		✓
Topic		✓		✓
Num.Obs.	2,046,109	2,046,109	3,533,930	3,533,930
R2 Adj.	0.015	0.283	0.009	0.320
R2 Within Adj.		0.001		0.002

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Results come from ordinary least squares models. The dependent variable is a measure of rhetorical similarity of two speeches given by members of the same party, on the same topic, on the same day. Standard errors are clustered at the member-pair level.

in the Senate—but not a positive one.

Next, we test these same hypotheses in the House. In column 3, the model that ex-

cludes fixed effects, we find mixed support. Here, the non-presidential House majority actually exercises stronger message discipline than the deep minority party, counter to our expectations. However, consistent with our hypotheses, the presidential House majority exercises weak message discipline as compared to the deep minority. These results also hold in the model that includes fixed effects, with the presidential minority now exercising stronger message discipline as well. But again, presidential House majority members exercise the weakest message discipline as compared to the deep minority.

Chamber Differences and Procedural Power

Although we did not expect this set of results in the House *ex-ante*, we believe they shed light on potential mechanisms behind message discipline and have implications for Procedural Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Koger and Lebo 2017). To this point, we have treated the House and Senate as more or less exchangeable. In practice, however, the chambers differ considerably. The Senate majority has much weaker control over its agenda than its House counterpart (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Smith 2007; Smith, Ostrander and Pope 2013; but see Gailmard and Jenkins 2007). Although the majority leader has the right of first recognition, the Senate operates on the unanimous consent of its members (Oleszek et al. 2020) and super-majorities are typically necessary to advance major policy goals (Smith 2014). These differences extend to debate as well. In the larger and more institutionalized House (Binder 1996, 1999; Wawro and Schickler 2018), speech is “controlled” by party floor managers who select speakers in advance, and rules dictate that speeches must be germane to legislation (outside of one-minute or special order periods). In the Senate, any member can seek recognition, speak on any issue (regardless of whether or not it is germane), and use the filibuster to extend debate or delay Senate action.

Taken together, these chamber differences provide a convincing explanation for why the House majority can better exercise message discipline. As detailed previously, the

House majority's agenda-setting power should allow them to raise issues most favorable to the majority, where they can present a cohesive message (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Although the Senate majority should do the same, their ability to control the floor is comparatively weaker and they may need to respond to issues raised by the minority. Even beyond this advantage, controlled debate will allow floor leaders to strategically select speakers who they know will advance the party's message. Finally, the majority party can weaponize their scheduling power to disrupt the minority's messaging strategies (Harris 2005). In the Senate, the minority faces few of these limitations. Any member can speak, obstruct the majority's agenda through the use of the filibuster, or go off-topic to promote issues where their party is more unified and present a clearer message. However, we note that this finding is likely, in part, a consequence of our use of floor speech data. Were we to look at e.g., press releases where the majority has no procedural power to control the speech, we would expect to see results more like those in the Senate.

The results in our model are consistent with both our theory of message discipline and theories of procedural power. In the House, this strong message discipline appears consistently *only* for the non-presidential majority. In this setting, the majority party knows they are facing an opposite-party president, and thus governing responsibility is shared. Although they cannot focus fully on messaging (Lee 2016), they are able to promote bills (e.g., repeal of the Affordable Care Act) that they would not pass in unified government, but that can unify their party and damage the president (Groseclose and McCarty 2001). By contrast, when the House majority captures the presidency, they become the responsible party and must actively govern. Here, the ability to message is weakest (Lee 2016), and it shows—presidential House majorities exercise comparatively weak message discipline—and the additive effect of controlling the Senate is more negative still. Although institutional power tends to disrupt message discipline, strong procedural power allows a party to control the agenda and promote an image of unity, even if that image is simply a mirage (cf. Lee 2018).

Message Discipline Hinders, not Helps, Legislating

To this point, we have shown that parties struggle to exercise message discipline when they command institutional power—especially when they control both the chamber majority and White House. Our results are consistent with literature highlighting the tension between legislating and messaging (Groeling 2010; Lee 2016) and provide robust evidence with a novel, text-based measure of message discipline. But does message discipline matter for legislating? Here, we argue that lawmakers, like parties, must choose between promoting a cohesive message or making substantive policy. We test this argument by considering whether lawmakers who are more on message are weaker legislators, and vice versa.

Why should on-message lawmakers be less effective legislators? Party messages are often simple and avoid tangling with the kinds of compromises necessary for policy development (Lee 2016). Lawmakers who adopt these messaging strategies repeatedly may do so because the tradeoffs between individual and collective goals are not so stark (Sellers 2009). These members are likely to be party soldiers, who “are loyal backbenchers and members of the party team who can be counted on to toe the party line and participate in the legislative process, but who do not appear to be particularly invested in policy specialization” (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018, 45-46). The choice to speak, and echo the party line, itself may imply that a member is not so focused on lawmaking generally. Instead, they may focus on ideological purity, messaging bills that will not become law, or non-policy considerations like attacking party leaders (Green 2015; Noble 2023). This style stands in contrast to the policy specialist who has a focused agenda, co-sponsors legislation, and engages less in speechmaking (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018). These lawmakers are more likely to adopt a rhetorical style at odds with the central tendency of their party in an effort to build cross-party coalitions and justify their heterogeneous decisions to constituents. We expect this tradeoff between message discipline and effective lawmaking to manifest in member behavior: the more a pair of lawmakers appear on message with

one another, the less likely they are engaging in complex policymaking, and therefore, the lower their legislative effectiveness should be.

To test this implication, we aggregate our data to the two-year congress level. The dependent variable in our analysis is the sum of the two legislators' legislative effectiveness scores for a given Congress (Volden and Wiseman 2014). At an individual level, these scores account for a member's ability to advance bills through the legislative process—from introduction to law. The sum of these values for a pair of lawmakers represents that dyad's pairwise legislative effectiveness. The sum could be comparatively low when two ineffective lawmakers are paired, high when two effective lawmakers are paired, or somewhere in between when one effective and one ineffective lawmaker are paired. Increases in this score indicate that the pair is becoming more effective (either because one or both lawmakers has improved). For each pair of lawmakers, our independent variable is a congress-level message discipline value that we construct by averaging over all of a pair's speech-dyad cosine similarity scores in a Congress. To the extent that message discipline is odds with legislating, we expect these pairwise legislative effectiveness scores to be lower for members who have higher pairwise message discipline—after controlling for institutional power.

As before, we run one set of models without pair fixed effects to examine the party-wide effects. However, this specification does not account for potential strategic considerations, like whether less effective members are more likely to speak when a party is in the wilderness. To that end, our second set of models includes pair fixed effects. This approach allows us to isolate within-pair change as the dyad goes on or off message and as party's institutional status changes. We use the same set of controls as in the previous section and add additional controls that account for how many pair-members are committee chairs, how many are subcommittee chairs, and how many times the dyad appears in each congress (effectively controlling for the number of speeches given by the pair).

We present our results in Table 3. In column 1, we consider the relationship between

Table 3: Legislative Effectiveness and Pairwise Message Discipline

	Senate		House	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pairwise Message Discipline	-0.283*** (0.057)	-0.459*** (0.063)	-0.342*** (0.019)	-0.086*** (0.023)
Majority Party	0.345*** (0.023)	0.307*** (0.021)	0.729*** (0.009)	1.025*** (0.012)
Presidential Co-Partisan	0.111*** (0.017)	0.106*** (0.013)	0.020** (0.008)	0.018*** (0.005)
Majority Party and Presidential Co-Partisan	0.489*** (0.022)	0.447*** (0.022)	0.759*** (0.010)	1.048*** (0.013)
Other Chamber Control	0.121*** (0.013)	0.180*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.005)	0.040*** (0.006)
Republican	0.014 (0.011)		0.121*** (0.005)	
Ideological Distance	-0.586*** (0.042)		-0.183*** (0.017)	
Same Gender Pair	-0.160*** (0.015)		-0.044*** (0.006)	
Both White	0.083* (0.036)		0.187*** (0.006)	
Leader in Pair	0.021 (0.013)	0.122*** (0.021)	0.241*** (0.008)	0.277*** (0.013)
Similar Previous Vote Share	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
Both Freshman	-0.747*** (0.040)	-0.592*** (0.028)	-0.376*** (0.013)	-0.496*** (0.010)
Both In-Cycle (Senate)	0.099*** (0.016)	0.152*** (0.015)		
Committee Chairs	1.258*** (0.010)	1.163*** (0.018)	3.496*** (0.007)	3.055*** (0.022)
Sub-Committee Chairs	0.301*** (0.010)	0.371*** (0.011)	1.000*** (0.004)	0.898*** (0.008)
Total Speeches	0.003*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.015*** (0.000)	0.007*** (0.000)
Intercept	1.267*** (0.054)		0.809*** (0.016)	
Member Dyad Fixed Effects		✓		✓
Num.Obs.	53,745	53,745	687,296	687,296
R2 Adj.	0.459	0.632	0.461	0.639
R2 Within Adj.		0.529		0.396

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Results come from ordinary least squares models. The dependent variable is the average pairwise message discipline at the Congress-level. Standard errors are clustered at the member-pair level.

message discipline and legislative effectiveness in the Senate. As expected, we find that an increase in message discipline is associated with a decrease in legislative effectiveness. In column 2, we show that this relationship is even stronger once we account for pair fixed effects. In terms of substantive effect size, a one standard deviation increase in message discipline is associated with a 0.04 point decrease in legislative effectiveness. This effect is about half the size of controlling the presidency and one-third as large as the effect of being a party leader. The effects of message discipline are similar, but attenuated, when we turn to the House in columns 3 and 4. Here, a one standard deviation increase in message discipline is associated with a 0.01 point decrease in legislative effectiveness—similar to the party controlling the presidency. Substantively, these effects are small, but message discipline is consistently, and significantly, associated with a decrease in legislative effectiveness within member pairs and across chambers. Certainly, it is not the strongest influence on legislative effectiveness, but is negatively associated with a legislator's ability to move their bills through the policymaking process.

These results are a natural implication of our theory and one that strengthens our argument about the tradeoff between message discipline and institutional power. Lawmakers who toe the party line and exercise strong message discipline are less effective legislators. For members, cohesive communication is generally at odds with the kind of ideological flexibility and squishy compromise necessary for making laws in a divided and polarized Congress.

Conclusion

Members of Congress compete for institutional power to advance individual and collective goals. Yet gaining power is only the first step. Newly empowered parties—those that control chamber majorities and the White House—must actually make their rhetoric a reality. These parties have procedural advantages that allow them to block internally

divisive bills and advance those over which the party agrees. However, empowered parties will struggle to exercise message discipline as they adopt ideologically flexible arguments, defend unsavory tradeoffs, and tailor their explanations for constituency subgroups. Dis-empowered parties, by contrast, can simply oppose the governing party and make unrealistic promises given their lack of responsibility—facilitating message discipline. Taken together, we argue that institutional power and message discipline are at odds. To provide support for our argument, we develop a novel measure of message discipline using the text of House and Senate floor debates from 1973–2016. We show that presidential majorities exercise the weaker message discipline as compared to non-presidential minorities. We also uncover an interesting difference between the chambers: whereas Senate majority power decreases message discipline, House majority power increases it. We view this difference as evidence consistent with theories of procedural power as key mechanism of party influence. Finally, we show that at the individual level, lawmakers who go on-message become less legislative effective.

Our results contribute to the literature on party branding and congressional message politics. Existing work has presenting a conflicting set of results about institutional power facilitating collective action on the one hand (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Koger and Lebo 2017) and, on the other, disrupting a parties' ability to effectively message for political gain (Groeling 2010; Green 2015; Lee 2016, 2018). We help resolve this tension with a cohesive theory and novel measure of message discipline. These findings also have implications for the literature on member self-presentation (e.g., Ban and Kaslovsky N.d.; Fenno 1978; Grimmer 2013) and polarizing congressional rhetoric (e.g., Ballard et al. 2023; Russell 2021; Noble 2023), raising new questions. For instance, are presidential majorities more likely to tailor their communications? Are they more likely to de-emphasize nationalized policy issues to lower the salience of internal disagreements? Further, we have focused on institutional power as a key constraint on message discipline. Yet, there are surely other systematic influence on pairwise rhetorical cohesion. In particular, we sus-

pect that *social* power facilitates message discipline. Historically marginalized groups, like black (Dietrich and Hayes 2023) and women (Ban and Kaslovsky N.d.) lawmakers, likely exercise stronger message discipline than more traditionally empowered white, male legislators.

Parties seek power by working collectively to broadcast a cohesive brand image. Yet the roll call record likely overstates the true degree of intra-party agreement (Lee 2018). Given that debate is long and frequently covered in the media (Groeling 2010; Sellers 2009), while voting is short and perhaps less visible to constituents (Blum, Cormack and Shoub 2023), we may also misunderstand how voters view party unity and branding. Legislators certainly act like what they say matters. For example, leaders have increased their communications staff at the expense of their legislative staff (Lee 2016), and Republicans have recently claimed credit for constituency spending they explicitly voted against. Thus, a focus on rhetoric is essential for understanding party unity and discipline in the modern era. Indeed, if voters care more about who wins the debate than who wins the vote, our results may point toward one potential explanation for thermostatic backlash in congressional elections (Grossmann and Wlezien 2024). If governing parties struggle to exercise message discipline in support of policies that dis-empowered parties uniformly oppose, it's no surprise voters would look to "throw the bums out." After all, it was only when Republicans made affirmative arguments in favor of repealing the ACA, a move Democrats stridently messaged against, that the legislation achieved its highest level of public support (Gallup 2017).

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Online Supporting Information: In Control but Incoherent

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A Measurement of Message Discipline

A.1 Keywords for keyATM Model

In Table 4, we present the set of topics and keywords used to fit our keyATM models. These keywords are the top 15 keywords ranked by tf-idf within the party platforms, treating each topic as a single document. The Parliamentary and Other topic keywords were generated by the authors.

Table 4: Topics and keywords used to fit the keyATM model

Category	Keywords
Agriculture	farm, rancher, farmer, ranch, export, commod, agricultur, fiber, grain, embargo, pariti, crop, livestock, food, wheat
Civil Rights	abort, disabl, gender, religi, sex, discrimin, religion, ballot, desegreg, vote, equal, segreg, reproduct, marriag, racial
Culture	art, artist, endow, film, museum, danc, leisur, opera, orchestra, theatr, scholar, heritag, writer, scholarship, music, cultur
Defense	nato, nuclear, missil, weapon, ballist, veteran, iraq, soviet, treati, troop, korea, allianc, deploy, vietnam, arm
Domestic Commerce	antitrust, merger, mortgag, gambl, dodd, lend, patent, sba, theft, conglomer, ftc, frank, consum, small, loan
Education	student, classroom, teacher, math, tuition, parent, read, academ, graduat, teach, elementari, english, childhood, bilingu, secondari
Energy	oil, gas, coal, solar, energi, nuclear, electr, petroleum, atom, geotherm, opec, decontrol, wind, fossil, ethanol
Environment	speci, pollut, emiss, wetland, superfund, toxic, air, carbon, greenhous, esa, soil, brownfield, wildlif, fish, habitat
Foreign Trade	export, trade, tariff, currenc, negoti, textil, reciproc, monetari, bilater, nafta, china, agreement, protectionist, gatt, foreign
Government Operations	postal, district, columbia, lobbi, census, elector, mail, servant, statehood, ballot, incumb, branch, candid, vote, sunset, usp

Health	medicar, medicaid, patient, hiv, healthcar, drug, coverag, nurs, diabet, mental, cancer, medic, prescript, diseas, health
Housing	homeownership, slum, mortgag, fha, rent, rental, urban, tenant, homeless, rural, fanni, freddi, mac, mae, neighborhood
Immigration	immigr, refuge, undocu, deport, visa, alien, reunif, english, amnesti, newcom, flee, asylum, citizenship, illeg, admiss
International Affairs	israel, africa, soviet, taiwan, palestinian, east, arab, cuba, peac, korea, terrorist, ireland, asia, afghanistan, cuban
Labor	overtim, hartley, taft, pension, bargain, picket, employe, bacon, davi, collect, worker, arbitr, autom, osha, union
Law and Crime	gun, crime, crimin, drug, sentenc, offend, firearm, juvenil, polic, prison, victim, narcot, pornographi, traffick, marijuana
Macroeconomics	deficit, inflat, monetari, bracket, spend, debt, incom, wealthi, wealthiest, recess, taxat, loophol, inflationari, estat, code
Public Lands	puerto, indian, rico, guam, forest, nativ, hawaiian, tribal, virgin, samoa, mariana, tribe, miner, park, wilder
Social Welfare	welfar, parent, needi, nutrit, stamp, social, elder, child, recipi, disabl, lunch, older, charit, mother, poverti
Technology	space, nasa, broadband, internet, broadcast, scientif, telecommun, orbit, saturn, spacecraft, satellit, scienc, cyber, entertain, media
Transportation	highway, railroad, merchant, passeng, rail, freight, airport, transport, mode, maritim, congest, traffic, amtrak, marin, truck
Parliamentary	yield, gentleman, consent, amend, time, minut, senat, hous, bill, order, thank, committe, move, vote, quorum, motion, tabl
Other	peopl, go, get, got, laughter, know, thing, want, say, think, thank

A.2 Face Validity of Speech Similarity

The following two speeches have a cosine similarity score of 1 and were coded as being about labor. These two speeches are identical:

Burton, Phillip (Democratic - California): Mr. Speaker. I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union

for the consideration of the bill to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to increase the minimum wage rate under that act. to provide for an automatic adjustment in such wage rate. and to repeal the credit against the minimum wage which is based on tips received by tipped employees.

Perkins, Carl Dewey (Democratic - Kentucky): Mr. Speaker. I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to increase the minimum wage rate under that Act. to provide for an automatic adjustment in such wage rate. and to repeal the credit against the minimum wage which is based on tips received by tipped employees.

The following two speeches have a cosine similarity score of 0.9 and were coded as being about health. They both discuss the Zika virus, and do so using similar language. Although the order in which information is presented differs, both representatives discuss the threat of Zika to pregnant women, stress the importance of public health measures, and appeal to lawmakers to pass funding to combat the virus.

Cornyn, John (Republican - Texas): Mr. President. over the past few months the Zika virus has not only spread across the Caribbean and Latin America. but it has become a matter of grave concern in the United States. Although many of the symptoms are relatively minor. Zika has been found to cause severe birth defects in children if the virus is acquired by a woman of childbearing age who is. in fact. pregnant. In places where the virus has been especially active. experts have found alarming rates of infants born with something called microcephaly in other words. basically a shrunken skull. Obviously. it is a profoundly damaging birth defect. This is due to the mother being infected by the virus while pregnant. As the weather continues to warm. Texans are rightly concerned about the continued spread of the virus in our State because it is transmitted primarily by mosquitoes. But it is not just any mosquito but those known to be present in places such as Texas. Florida. Louisiana. and some of the warmer areas. But we dont know if that will always be the case or whether they will expand their range or exactly how this could unroll. In fact. cases in 11 Texas counties have already been confirmed. including Austin. Houston. and Dallas. One important distinction in these cases is that they are tied to people traveling to Latin America. Puerto Rico. or Central America right now. In other words. there has been no confirmed case. I believe. by the Centers for Disease Control of anybody actually being bitten by

a mosquito in the United States and having acquired the Zika virus. But that doesn't mean that it is not potentially dangerous. In fact, for the reasons I have mentioned, along with the fact that we now have at least a couple of cases of confirmed sexual transmission of the Zika virus. Fortunately, top research and medical facilities in Texas have been working on ways to prevent the spread of the Zika virus and to protect all Americans from its symptoms. A few months ago, I visited with some of those at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, where they told me about their work in Brazil studying this virus. As the world leader in mosquito-borne viruses, their research is continually groundbreaking. In fact, recently the Brazilian Ministry of Health announced a collaboration with researchers at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston to help them develop a Zika virus vaccine. They have also had experience when it comes to tackling other large-scale viruses. Last year UTMB was named one of the first regional Ebola treatment centers in the country, and UTMB researchers went on to develop an effective, quick-acting Ebola vaccine. When they stressed the urgent need for the United States to approach this virus in a careful and deliberate manner, I listened to what they were telling me. I heard a similar message when I recently visited the Texas Medical Center in Houston. They, too, are medical pioneers and are working to create a rapid test for the virus and to strengthen mosquito control in potential hot spots. Interestingly, this is one of the most important components of dealing with the Zika virus, that is, mosquito control. Indeed, we will hear more about some of the EPA regulations that are currently in effect which discourage or inhibit the ability of local public health units in places such as Houston, Galveston, and elsewhere to actually control the mosquito population. We will talk more about that later. But like the researchers in Galveston, these folks at the Texas Medical Center urge congressional action so that our country can be better prepared to handle this potential health crisis, instead of having to react after the fact. When the cases of Ebola were confirmed in Dallas, I remember very clearly how people felt overwhelmed by the fast-developing situation on the ground, so much so that they really did not feel that they were totally prepared ahead of time to deal with it. We don't want to make that mistake twice when it comes to the Zika virus. Conversations I have had with these Texas institutions, as well as the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control, the CDC, have underscored to me the need to act with urgency to avert what could become a major public

health crisis in this country. Because States like mine boast a warmer climate and they are in closer proximity to where the mosquitoes that currently carry the Zika virus are located. we will likely serve on the frontline in dealing this summer with this response nationwide. Congress cant afford to sit back and do nothing. I dont hear anybody saying: Do nothing. I hear everybody saying we need to act clearly. with dispatch. and without unnecessary delay. But part of what we need to do is to make sure we have a plan in place and that we are executing a plan in a way that maximizes the effectiveness in combatting not only the mosquitoes that carry this virus but also the virus itself. We have to make sure our public health officials on the frontline of research and prevention have the resources they need to get the job done too. Fortunately. tomorrow. the Senate will vote on several pieces of legislation designed to provide additional Federal funding so public officials can handle this impending crisis head on. The first proposal is from the President of the United States. President Obama has made a spending request of nearly \$2 billion that isnt paid for. It is emergency funding. meaning that the funding would be deficitincreasing and debtincreasing. Also. the Presidents proposal to spend \$2 billion comes without very much in the way of a plan about how the administration would use the money. I guess they are asking us to trust them. but. frankly. I think we have a greater responsibility to make sure that the money will be put to good use and that we have appropriated an adequate amount of moneybut not more money than is necessaryto deal with this potential crisis. The second piece of legislation we will vote on is a compromise package that was negotiated between the chairman and the ranking member of the Labor. Health and Human Services Appropriations Subcommittee in a bipartisan and commonsense way. I congratulate Senator BLUNT and Senator MURRAY for working through this in an orderly sort of process. and I commend them on reaching an agreement. Their compromise bill is basically for \$1.1 billion. In other words. it is not the \$1.9 billion or \$2 billion that the President requested. They thought the \$1.1 billion was a more accurate and justifiable number. Unfortunately. the legislation that has been negotiated between the chairman and the ranking member of the Labor. Health and Human Services Appropriations Subcommittee is not paid for either. What this would essentially do is borrow from our children and grandchildren to meet the present exigencies of this crisis. The good news is we have a third option. which I want to talk about briefly. It is a third piece of legislation that I have introduced and which

is nearly identical to the BluntMurray proposal. the Appropriations subcommittee proposal. It would also provide a compromise of \$1.1 billion in Federal funding targeted toward health care professionals across the country. But my bill has a key distinction. It is fully paid for. You might ask: Where does that money come from? When the Affordable Care Act ObamaCare. as it has come to be known was passed. it included a provision for the Prevention and Public Health Fund. This. again. was part of the Affordable Care Act. The purpose that was stated in the legislation was "to provide for expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs." In other words. it could have been tailor-made to deal with this potential Zika crisis. What I would propose is that we deal with the problem without delay. We appropriate the right amount of money. which both Democrats and Republicans at least in the Appropriations Committee have agreed is \$1.1 billion. but that we take available funds and funds that will be available under the Prevention and Public Health Fund. and we pay for it. You wouldn't think that would be particularly revolutionary or novel around here. but unfortunately I think too often what we do is we act in an emergency or to avert an emergency and we don't follow through and do it in a fiscally responsible sort of way. The fact of the matter is we do need to address the Zika virus. There is no doubt about that. There is no difference among us in this Chamber or in Congress about the need to deal with that. As a matter of fact. the House of Representatives has proposed a version of their response today. I believe. But we need to do this responsibly. There is no reason why we have to put our country deeper in debt to protect ourselves against this virus. We don't have an endless supply of money. The Federal Treasury can't just keep printing money. and we can't just keep imposing on our children and grandchildren the responsibilities to pay the money back that we continue to borrow. particularly when we have a fund available to offset this expenditure. As the Presiding Officer well knows. our growing debt in and of itself is a threat to our country's future and our way of life. The Presiding Officer and I have listened to the Senator from Georgia. Mr. PERDUE. talk about what impact our debt has on our ability not only to withstand another financial crisis. such as we had in 2008. but simply to fund such essential functions of the Federal Government like national defense. Particularly. as the interest rates are going up. more and more money is going to be paid to our bond holders. such as China and others. instead of paying for essential functions of the government. like national defense or

safety net programs that we all agree are worthwhile. If we can deal with this potential crisis and do so in a fiscally responsible way without growing the debt. then we ought to be able to do that. This should be a no-brainer. We should take this opportunity tomorrow to give our public health officials and local officials back home the resources they need to protect our constituents—the American people—against the spread of the Zika virus. but we ought to do so without adding to our mounting debt. Fortunately. this legislation also includes a provision that would waive provisions of the Clean Water Act I have referred to those a little earlier and permit State and local officials to spray to protect against mosquitoes year around. Unfortunately. this particular legislation. the Clean Water Act. has provisions in it that essentially tie the hands of public health officials when it comes to mosquito eradication. which is one of the essential components of a strategy to defeat this potential crisis. We all agree that the Zika virus is a real threat with real public health consequences. It has already impacted a generation in Brazil and other Latin American countries. We are told it is apparently rampant in Puerto Rico and Haiti. and there is no question it is coming our way. With the summer months ahead of us. the potential for this virus to spread to the United States is a major concern that we ought to address with dispatch. We have to give those on the ground the tools and support they need to address this threat. but we have to do so in a responsible way. I urge our colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support the legislation which funds the Zika prevention program at \$1.1 billion but pays for it out of the Prevention and Public Health Fund. as apparently this fund was created to do to “provide for expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs.” I urge my colleagues on both sides to support this legislation when we have a chance to vote tomorrow. The time to act is now. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Portman, Rob (Republican - Ohio): Madam President. I rise today to talk about the Zika virus. We will have a vote on this tomorrow. Tonight I wish to speak about the need for us to move forward with emergency funding with regard to this virus. We need to combat it. It is spreading. It poses a threat to the safety of women. children. and the elderly. It is particularly important that we keep it from spreading because there is no known Zika vaccine or treatment. A lot of my constituents have asked me about this back home. This is a virus that has spread from Africa. to Asia. to Latin America. and now it is coming into our own country. It is spreading so quickly because

it is insidious. It is difficult to test for it because it is usually confused with other viruses. like dengue. It can only be detected in a few days after you get it in the blood. Many of its symptoms in older adults are similar to other viruses. such as influenza. so it is tough to know whether you have it. It is typically contracted simply by being bitten by a mosquito. and two kinds of mosquitoes both of which are in the United States are the problem. We now know that it can also be transmitted by sexual activity. We are told that men may be able to sexually transmit the virus for months after the initial infection based on some experiences. So. again. this is a difficult issue. Some people may not even know they have it. yet they might be spreading it. The spread of the virus is accelerating. It took 60 years for Zika to make it out of Africa to the Pacific. Just 8 years after that. it reached the Western Hemisphere in Latin America. Today it has infected people in 62 countries. including the United States and 34 other countries in the Americas. so pretty much every country in the Americas is now infected with it. Hundreds of Americans have been infected. We know of nearly 500. including 48 pregnant women and 12 people in my home State of Ohio. in fact. Thus far. it looks as though all of the Americans who have become infected did so by traveling overseas. being infected by the mosquito or by sexual contact with someone who had Zika. The World Health Organization calls it "a threat of alarming proportions" because it is spreading so quickly and because it has serious consequences for the most vulnerable in our society. particularly the elderly an older gentleman in Puerto Rico recently died of Zika children. babies in the womb. which we will talk about in a second. and pregnant women. As Zika has spread. health officials have reported an increased incidence of babies born with a horrible birth defect where a baby's head and brain are abnormally small. The consequences of this birth defect are absolutely tragic. These kids have seizures. slow development. intellectual disabilities. and often loss of hearing and vision. The consequences last a lifetime. There is no known cure for this disease. We don't want any child to have to suffer through that. It is in all of our interests to protect more babies from this syndrome. In Brazil. there have been more than 900 confirmed cases since Zika arrived. with another 4,000 suspected cases. These are conservative estimates. and they are rising. That is up from around an average of 150 each year a 600 percent increase from year to year. Officials also tell us that Zika can cause what is called Guillain-Barre syndrome. which causes the body's immune system to attack its own nerves. It is a cruel syn-

drome. and in bad cases it can cause total paralysis and loss of sensation. This can happen to anyone. not just newborns but adults as well. These are just two of the neurological side effects that can result. and. like Zika. they are thought to be incurable. For most adults. Zika is not fatal. but to the most vulnerable. like the elderly and the unborn. it could be a lifetime of suffering. disability. or even death. I mentioned the man in Puerto Rico who died last week after being infected by Zika. a fellow American. His immune system began to attack the platelets in his blood. so they couldnt clot. and that was the effect for him. As Zika spreads. it becomes clearer than ever that our response has to be very aggressive. both domestically and internationally. It has to be aggressive. and therefore it has to be funded. That is why I think it is important that we deal with emergency funding before it is truly an emergency. I thank my colleagues for the steps they have already taken to improve our response. In March. this body passed and President Obama signed into law bipartisan legislation which I cosponsored with my friend Senator FRANKEN that will give accelerated priority review at the Food and Drug Administration for new drugs and vaccines to treat Zika. This is very important. and I applaud the Senate for moving quickly and the administration for moving on that. It is a critical step. Right now. there is no cure and no treatment. President Obama has signed it into law. I am also grateful to the administration for redirecting more than \$500 million of residual Ebola funds that were originally appropriated by Congress to deal with Ebola and were not necessary. They stopped using those funds for Ebola and shipped those funds over to Zika to stop it from spreading. I applaud them for that as well. Again. we have more work to do. and it is my view that we ought to move forward with emergency funding. There was a proposal I believe it was finalized just last week. Thursday or Friday from Senator BLUNT and Senator MURRAY that goes a long way toward dealing with this issue. The majority of the funding is right here in the United States. while the rest will go to international immigration purposes so we can keep Zika from crossing our borders again. A lot of this funding goes to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention the majority of it to enhance mosquito control programs. improve infrastructure for testing for Zika. and expand the pregnancy risk assessment monitoring system. all of which are important. This is emergency funding. and I think it is necessary. Some funding also helps provide health services for pregnant women in Puerto Rico and invests in scientific research for a treatment or a vaccine. This is perhaps

the most important thing we can do. These are critical priorities. I would also note that I am pleased that we have maintained the Hyde protections in this proposal. and I believe this is consistent with the goal of protecting innocent life. protecting these innocent babies from birth defects. We want this funding to be used to help preserve life and to help the vulnerable. We need to ensure adequate funding. We have to recognize the tools already at our disposal and use them. I have remained in contact with the Secretary of the Air Force as this virus has spread to make clear that in Ohio we have reservists at Youngstown Air Reserve Station who are ready to help. This Air Reserve Station in Youngstown, OH. is the home of the 910th Airlift Wing, which is the only fixedwing aerial spray unit in the United States. It has been used by the military all over the United States. They have played key roles in other public health emergencies, including spraying millions of acres in Louisiana and Texas for mosquito abatement after Hurricane Katrina. I believe they could play that same role now. They are ready to do it, but frankly they need an upgrade in their equipment to be able to do it. As RADM Stephen Redd of the CDC told me in the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, "there could be a role for that airwing in locations that do not have [finely honed mosquito control enterprises]." He said that a lot of counties in this country do not have that. He said: "One of the things that we think is really important that the Zika virus outbreak is pointing out is the need to really revitalize those mosquito control efforts." I couldn't agree with him more. We need to revitalize these efforts to be sure we have them and use the tools that are at our disposal right now. If Zika were to spread around the country, it is incredibly important that we have this control effort. I hope we move forward on this in the next couple of days, send this legislation to the President for his signature, and get moving on dealing with the Zika emergency we have before us. People all over Ohio ask me about it because they are worried. We need to keep our constituents safe, and we need to give them peace of mind. Adopting the amendment I think we are going to have before us in the next couple of days is the best action we can take right now to achieve these goals, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to strongly support emergency funding for this purpose. Thank you. I yield back my time.

The following two speeches have a cosine similarity of 0.5 and are coded as being about civil rights. These speeches obviously differ, but they also contain some similarities. Both speeches are about racial discrimination in housing—both explicitly use the phrase

“racial discrimination,” the former in the context of property appraisals and the second in the context of residential housing.

Seiberling, John F. (Democratic - Ohio): If the gentleman could let me ask the other question. the difficulty with the Hyde amendment is that while it states that it does not apply to action by the appraiser with the purpose of racial discrimination. it does not deal with the effect of the appraisers action. The effect is the problem here. not just the purpose.

Brown, George E., Jr. (Democratic - California): Mr. Chairman. overt racial discrimination remains in one major sector of American life that of housing. Congress and the courts have acted to eliminate discrimination in education, voting, and employment. but many minorities are not free to live where they choose. The basic purpose of this legislation is to permit people who have the ability to do so to buy any house offered to the public if they can afford to buy it. It would not overcome the economic problem of those who could not afford to purchase the house of their choice. Mr. Chairman. the words I have just spoken are appropriate for today. but the sad truth of the matter is that they were originally spoken on the floor of the Senate 12 years ago by then Senator Monrath Dale when considering the fair housing provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. Despite 12 years of Federal law prohibiting discrimination in the sale or a rental of housing, discrimination continues to persist against racial minorities, handicapped persons and others. Studies by the Department of Housing and Urban Development show that, in 1980, a black seeking a rental unit has an 85 percent chance of encountering discrimination. A Hispanic in Dallas has a 65- and 95 percent chance of encountering discrimination, depending on whether his skin tone is light or dark. These facts are disturbing. The 1968 Civil Rights Act was intended to specifically address this kind of overt discrimination. Now, we find that discrimination exists in areas beyond the sale or rental of housing, like mortgages and home insurance. Why is this problem so pervasive if this law has been on the books for so long? One answer comes from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. In its annual report, the commission concluded, among other things: - Title VIII is a weak law that does not provide effective enforcement mechanisms for insuring fair housing, and - HUD, which is charged with the overall administration of the law, lack enforcement authority. So, 12 years ago, we enacted a law in direct response to a show-

ing of discrimination in housing and. more significant- ly. in response to the rioting in major urban areas. and then failed to give the appropriate agency any enforcement authority. Now. more than ever. the time has come for an effective fair housing bill. Projected demand for housing will far exceed the available supply in the next decade. If the patterns of discrimination that now exist continue into the 1980s. any gains we have made over the last decade will be lost. And. if our social indicators are still correct. the rioting in Miami should be a warning to the Members of this body of the critical situation in our Nations black communities. I urge my colleagues to give their wholehearted support to this legislation and to oppose any amendments that would weaken its effect.e

Finally, these speeches have a cosine similarity of 0.2 and are coded as being about international affairs. These speeches differ considerably. While they are both about foreign countries, the regional and topical focus differ.

Kennedy, Edward M. (Democratic - Massachusetts): Mr. President. both Senator HUMPHREY. and I have traveled to the Middle East many times. and have many close friends in Israel and friends in Arab countries. as well. Should we not be making clear to all concerned that the best way of securing a real American commitment to the future is to continue working in the directions now begun by Israel and Egypt? That time is really on no ones side unless it is used wisely now for the next step. and the next. toward peace?

Hartke, Vance (Democratic - Indiana): Mr. President. October 10 marks the anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. The Republic of China. with a population of 16.000.000 people is among Americas largest trading partners. The per capita income has risen In recent years to about \$900. The gross national product is \$14 billion. In recent years there has been no radical change in the Republic of Chinas policy toward the United States. and we still maintain a mutual security treaty. CXXI2071Part 25 Presently there are 2.800 military personnel on Taiwan. but none of these are described as combat forces. Because of the trading arrangement with the United States. a large number of Americans maintain residences in Taiwan. The economy of the Republic of China is diversified from textiles to electronics with the fishing industry a steady moneymaker. The present President is Yen ChaiKan to whom. along with the government and the people. we extend our congratulations on this anniversary.

B Alternative Coding of Legislative Effectiveness

Given the potential difficulty of interpreting summed legislative effectiveness in pairs where one lawmaker has high legislative effectiveness and the other has low legislative effectiveness, we construct an alternative measure for robustness. First, we categorize each lawmaker to be high-effective or low-effective, depending on whether they are more legislatively effective than the median of all of their peers in the corresponding chamber. Then, we create trichotomous ordinal variable accounting for pair effectiveness: (low, low) as 1, (low, high) or (high, low) as 2, and (high, high) as 3. Our theory leads us to predict that as a pair's message discipline increases, their probability of being placed into a higher category will decrease.

To test the relationship between being on-message and legislative effectiveness, we fit ordinal logistic regressions using this alternative explanatory variable and the same sets of covariates included in Table 3, model (1) and (3). As shown in Table 5, rhetorical similarity of speeches is, again, negatively associated with this alternative measure of legislative effectiveness. As a pair's message discipline increases, that pair is less likely to be placed in a higher-ordered category and more likely to be placed in a lowered-ordered category. Our conclusion, that on-message lawmakers are less effective legislators, holds.

Table 5: Ordinal Legislative Effectiveness and Pairwise Message Discipline

	Senate	House
	(1)	(2)
Pairwise Message Discipline	-0.892*** (0.096)	-0.573*** (0.020)
Majority Party	0.770*** (0.038)	1.217*** (0.009)
Presidential Co-Partisan	0.044 (0.028)	0.055*** (0.008)
Majority Party and Presidential Co-Partisan	0.764*** (0.037)	1.186*** (0.010)
Other Chamber Control	-0.056* (0.022)	0.103*** (0.005)
Republican	0.118*** (0.018)	0.340*** (0.005)
Ideological Distance	-0.915*** (0.071)	-0.161*** (0.018)
Same Gender Pair	-0.382*** (0.026)	-0.199*** (0.006)
Both White	0.315*** (0.061)	0.009 (0.006)
Leader in Pair	0.164*** (0.022)	0.134*** (0.009)
Similar Previous Vote Share	0.003* (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)
Both Freshman	-2.007*** (0.079)	-0.525*** (0.014)
Both In-Cycle (Senate)	0.213*** (0.028)	
Committee Chairs	0.909*** (0.018)	0.985*** (0.008)
Sub-Committee Chairs	0.668*** (0.018)	0.872*** (0.005)
Total Speeches	0.003*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)
Num.Obs.	53745	687296
AIC	95049.9	1254934.7
BIC	95210.0	1255129.2
RMSE	1.90	1.90

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$